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Computer science originated in the People’s Republic of China in
1956 with the founding of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute
of Computing Technology. The Soviet Union, which played a pivotal
role, gave the Chinese the opportunity to learn computer science by
supplying components and describing the manufacturing process.
The Soviets also helped solve key difficulties and trained workers.
In 1956, the Chinese Science Planning
Commission of the State Council organized
scientists around the country to prepare a re-
port for developing science and technology
over the next 12 years. This report led to the
founding of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’
Institute of Computing Technology.
In this article, we describe the events and
ideas that led up to the institute’s founding,
including the role played by the Soviet Union
and Soviet experts. The Soviet Union not only
helped the Chinese become acquainted with
computing technology but also made sugges-
tions for managing Chinese development
efforts.
Overview: A technology policy
On 1 July 1949, the Chinese Communist
Party formally adopted a policy—called leaning
to one side—of looking to the Soviet Union for
technological and economic advice. Chinese
leaders had little choice but to accept such
a policy, because the US and other Western
countries were refusing to export technology
to China. Responding to the actions of the
Western countries, the Soviet Union hoped to
bring China within the block of socialist
countries.
Public evidence of the Soviet strategy was
seen in 1954, when a delegation of Soviet
officials, led by the new premier, Nikita
Khrushchev, visited China and promised great-
er scientific, technological, and economic aid.
In 1956, with the assistance of the Soviet
experts, the Chinese government developed
a protocol, outlined in the report Long-term
Protocol for Developing National Sciences and
Technology between 1956 and 1967. This pro-
tocol proposed to increase investment in 12
important fields of science and technology.
Chinese officials identified four fields as
critical for national security: one was comput-
ing technology. They stated that developing
these fields would require an emergency effort
because of pressure from the West. On the
basis of this report, the Chinese government
decided to develop electronic digital compu-
ters, establish the Institute of Computing
Technology of the Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS), and—most significantly—to
borrow the basic computing technology from
the Soviet Union.
For the Chinese to produce results, they
needed the Soviet Union’s help. The Soviet
Union began in the early stage of the 1950s to
supply informal aid, consisting of informal
exchanges of information and suggestions on
developing computing. In 1956, the Soviet
Union helped China create the plan for
developing computing technology over the
next 12 years. In 1958, the Soviet Union
formalized an agreement with China, called
the 122-Project Convention (The Convention
on Soviet Union and China Cooperating and Soviet
Union Helping China with Significant Scientific
and Technical Research). Consequently, Chi-
nese scientists were able to create the model
104 computer by 1959.
Soon, however, tensions began to build
between the Chinese and Soviet governments.
The leaders of the Soviet Union and China
never fully trusted each other. While China
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was determined tomastermodern technology,
especially national defense technology, the
Soviet leaders was always of two minds. On
one hand, Soviet leaders remained unsure of
Mao Zedong’s desire to stay independent of
Soviet technology, nuclear protection, and
general strategy, and expressed reluctance to
provide China with advanced weapons. On
the other hand, Mao Zedong was needed to
support the Soviet Union’s leadership inside
the socialist bloc during Nikita Khrushchev’s
campaign to remove Stalinism in 1956.
Khrushchev agreed in 1957 to give China
advanced military technology. Thereafter, he
and Mao Zedong slowly moved toward differ-
ent interpretations of socialism and commu-
nism, and their divergence escalated.
In July 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew its
experts from China, an event that marked the
breakdown of Sino-Russian relationships. In
subsequent years, the two countries became
increasingly antagonistic. The Soviet Union
began reducing its aid to China in science,
technology, and the economy and stopped all
aid in the late 1960s. Despite this turnabout,
China continued to develop computing tech-
nology and successfully created a set of fast,
transistor computers in 1965 for national
defense and all-purpose use.
Because Chinese computing technology
related specifically to military needs, the
history of that technology has seldom been
disclosed. In recent years, however, some
publications have described parts of this
history.1 Also, some of the computer research-
ers of the 1960s have discussed how they
duplicated Soviet computers. In these ac-
counts, Chinese researchers usually empha-
sized the Chinese effort and rarely discussed
Soviet aid.
Before we began our research, the most
important international research paper was
‘‘Computer Technology in Communist China
(1956–1965),’’ written by Donald G. Audette
in 1966, which described the development of
Chinese computing technology.2 However,
because Audette could not obtain sufficient,
reliable sources for crucial context, his de-
scription and conclusion were incomplete. For
example, Audette stated that China hadn’t
mastered computing technology before Soviet
experts left China and that the first Chinese
computers were used mainly in mathematical
calculation.
As we will explain, Chinese scientists
mastered computing technology before the
Soviets left, and their work was used for many
applications. Using archival records as well as
the testimony of early Chinese computing
experts, we describe the foundation of the
Institute of Computing Technology within
CAS and show how computing technology
was transferred from the Soviet Union to
China.
Early research and decision making
As we’ve said, CAS was founded in 1949.
Three years later, CAS scientists created a tenta-
tive plan to develop computing technology and
organized a computer research group led by
Hua Luogeng.1 In July 1953, a delegation of
CAS researchers, who had visited the Soviet
Union earlier that year, held a special sympo-
sium on science and technology. During the
symposium’s mathematics section, Hua pro-
posed that China develop skills in differential
equations, mechanics, elliptical functions,
mathematical statistics, and computational
mathematics. Hua also advised China to ensure
that these skills were disseminated at Chinese
universities to train engineers and scientists.3
This proposal caught the attention of CAS’s
leaders. On 15 October 1953, CAS held a meet-
ing to discuss the scientific research plan for an
Institute of Mathematics. The research plan
included implementing Hua’s proposal.
At this meeting, Hua recommended that
China put into practice, and learn by experi-
ence, what it had acquired from the Soviet
Union and establish eight mathematical re-
search divisions, or groups, one of which
would study computational mathematics.
Hua believed that computational mathe-
matics was urgently needed and was the
weakest link in Chinese research. However,
Qian Sanqiang, director of the CAS Institute
for Modern Physics, thought the CAS plan for
developing electronic computers was too
ambitious because it required a significant
investment of equipment and people. He
suggested that computers be developed
through a plan that would begin with the
simplest objectives and develop more gradu-
ally, working with the CAS mathematical
divisions. Wu Youxun, vice president of CAS,
agreed and decided that the academy should
develop computationalmathematics and train
professional specialists in this field by building
an electronic computer. He also concluded
that research for electronic computers should
be done in the Institute of Physics’ electronics
group and ordered that Hua’s computer re-
search group be transferred to that institute.4
By early 1954, China was already studying
Soviet computing technology. The CAS com-
puter research scientists had translated the
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Soviet book The Approaches to Study Radiant
Electronics (edited by A.A. Sanin, published in
1958) to study radio tube pulse circuits.
Furthermore, in October 1954, three kinds
of computers were shown at the Exhibition of
the Achievements of the Soviet Economy and
Culture Construction in the Soviet Exhibition
Hall (today’s Beijing Exhibition Center). The
exhibition had an analog computer, an elec-
tronic integrator to work out linear differential
equations, and a computer to calculate a de-
flection differential equation. At director
Qian’s request, the CAS computer group spent
a lot of time learning, studying, and analyzing
these three computers.
CAS’s 1954 research plan included the
study of computational mathematics. The
Institute of Mathematics would conduct the
research; in conjunction, the Institute of
Physics would study computing machines.
This plan called for scientists from both
institutes to prepare a working laboratory in
1955 and, if possible, begin the mathematical
design of an electronic computer.5 An interim
report that CAS issued, the Developing Plan of
Science Undertakings of CAS between 1953 and
1957, didn’t outline a further plan on com-
puting technology.6
On 4 October 1955, the Division of Physics,
Mathematics, and Chemistry held the fourth
meeting of the CAS standing committee, at
which nuclear physicist Deng Jiaxian gave
a preliminary report on the division’s research
development. He said thatmathematics would
first deal with three subjects—differential
equations, probability and mathematical sta-
tistics, and computational mathematics. Only
after a mathematics department had been
established in these areas would the mathe-
maticians begin to further develop computa-
tional mathematics. He also suggested that
a department of computing technology be
established instead of a department of com-
putational mathematics.7
Within CAS, growing interest in computing
machines was matched by a similar interest
within the Chinese government.8 In January
1956, the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party held a conference of intel-
lectuals, where Premier Zhou Enlai empha-
sized that the computer was an important
technical revolution.9 According to the recol-
lections of computer scientists Xia Peisu and
Zhang Xiaoxiang, the Central Government
began, by March 1956, to acknowledge the
importance of developing electronic compu-
ters. About this time, they decided to give
electronic computers a place within the long-
term protocol for developing science and
technology. The Central Government also
invited Sergei A. Lebedev, superintendent of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ Institute of
PrecisionMachinery andComputing Technol-
ogy Research, to China to help plan the
research for computing technology.10
At the same time, theChinese scientists had
made some independent progress in develop-
ing computing circuits. For example, in April
1956,Wu Jikang of the CAS computer research
group succeeded in demonstrating oscillo-
scope tube memory.1
Suggestions from Soviet experts
In conjunction with their research on
computing technology, Chinese scientists
were receiving advice from the Soviets. In
August 1955, a delegation from the Soviet
Academy of Sciences visited China. A member
of this delegation, a Mr. Kostenko, suggested
that China should investigate electronic ana-
logcomputers.11Another Soviet scientist, aMr.
Cherkashin, suggested that China send re-
searchers to study analog computers at the
Soviet Academy of Sciences and then bring the
computers back to China.12
On 5 January 1956, the CAS standing
committee met to discuss plans for establish-
ing the Institute ofMechanics. At themeeting,
Boris R. Lazarenko recommended that CAS
should use computers for cybernetic work and
research.12 The meeting participants quickly
approved this suggestion. Accordingly, the
committee asked Hua, the deputy director,
andQin Lisheng, the deputy secretary-general,
to prepare a research plan that would create an
electronic computer.13
This program did little to advance comput-
ing research, however. A more important
event in the development of Chinese electron-
ic computers was a March 1956 conference in
Moscow, on utilizing mathematical machines
and instruments for Soviet manufacturing and
development. The secretary-general of the
presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
A.V. Topchaev, invited a CAS delegation to
this meeting. The meeting participants dis-
cussed problems of designing and program-
ming high-speed electronic computers, as well
as the problems of special computers and
analog devices.14 The delegation CAS sent
included Min Naida, Hu Shihua, Wu Jikang,
Zhang Xiaoxiang, Xu Xianyu, and Lin Jian-
xiang.14
These delegates were responsible for pre-
paring a computing technology research plan.
While visiting Moscow, they paid close atten-
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tion to the Soviet experience. They visited the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, including the
Institute of Precision Machinery and Comput-
ing Technology, the Computing Center, the
Institute of Dynamics, the Institute of Auto-
control and Distant Control, and the Com-
puting Center at Moscow University’s mathe-
matics department. They saw the newest
Soviet computer, the BESM—Bystrodeistvuyush-
chaya Elektronnaya Schetnaya Mashina (high-
speed electronic calculating machine)—and
they investigated the curriculum of Moscow
University’s computer machine department.
Meeting with Lebedev
The delegates also attended symposia with
key Soviet scientists: S.A. Lebedev, who had
designed the first Soviet computer, A.A. Dor-
odnitsin, the director of the Computing
Center of the Soviet Academy of Sciences,
and S.L. Sobolev, the director of the mathe-
matics education and research group at Mos-
cow University.
During his symposium, Lebedev made
a number of important recommendations:14
1. China should set up a research organization of
computing technology. This organization
should have a research institute of pre-
cision machinery and computing technol-
ogy, a computing center, and a rudimenta-
ry factory like those in the Soviet Union.
This organization should have approxi-
mately 100 researchers in the institute
and 50 workers or so in the factory. At
the beginning, the computing center could
be combined with the research organiza-
tion. The computer center could be re-
moved after three years and operated as an
independent organization.
2. China should actively train workers for this
new field:
—Postgraduates from China would at-
tend classes in the mathematics and
mechanics departments at Moscow
University, and should start studying
computing technology immediately,
so that they would master the technol-
ogy.
—China should create two computer
research groups of mathematicians
and electrical engineers. In each group,
at least one or two persons should be
mechanics specialists. The group size
could range from 10 to 25 people. Each
worker should hold a graduate degree.
—China should send two groups of
Russian-speaking high school gradu-
ates to study in the Soviet Union. Each
group should consist of 25 to 30
students. One group would study com-
putational mathematics in Moscow
University; the other would learn
how to build a computer at Moscow
Dynamics College. Chinese students
would follow an accelerated plan so
that they would finish their study
within three or four years.
— In China, there should be 40 to 100
people who could change their profes-
sions and become computer research-
ers. Invite Soviet experts to China to
give lectures on a short-term basis, say,
for one month so that the Chinese
could study theories of computing.
One goal was for Chinese students to
teach computing in the future, even
before computingmachineswere avail-
able.
— Chinese universities and colleges
should start courses in computational
mathematics and computer manufac-
ture. Soviet experts could visit these
schools to teach the courses that the
Chinese were unable to teach.
—The Chinese should use Soviet refer-
ence books and textbooks, and what-
ever books it can acquire from the UK
and the US. The Soviet Union could
provide any information that China
needed on the subject of computation.
—After 5 or 10 years, China should be
graduating 200 to 300 graduates in
computational mathematics, and 500
to 600 graduates in computer manu-
facture each year. Those numbers
could change depending on the pace
of development in China.
3. China should pay attention to the development
of the radio industry and the hardware of high-
speed electronic digital computers. Specifical-
ly, it should develop radio components,
radio tubes, ferromagnetic materials, semi-
conductors, photoelectric materials and
photographic materials, printed circuits,
magnetic tape readers, industrial assem-
blies, and cables.
Lebedev further recommended that this
work should be done with creativity and self-
reliance. He gave a three-step plan:
1. First, the Soviet Union would transfer the
Soviet machines to China (under the
condition of owning the Soviet machines)
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and China would train its operators to use
and manufacture computers.
2. Next, China would build its ownmachines
from Soviet material and parts.
3. Finally, China would build its own
machines using Chinese materials and
parts.
On their return to China, the delegation
reported Lebedev’s recommendations and
added comments of their own.14 The group
reported that:
1. We have studied the development of the
electronic computer in the Soviet Union.
We discovered that the plan the Soviet
Union used to develop the computer is
similar to the plan established by CAS in
1953 to enter the field of computing
machines and to establish Chinese inde-
pendence.
2. We learned the details of the Soviet
organizations in this field and how math-
ematicians and engineers cooperate to
establish a new independent computing
department. We learned how Chinese
organizations in this field should be estab-
lished to be most effective.
3. Through this visit, we increased our specif-
ic knowledge of the electronic computer
and its importance and developing per-
spective.
4. By talking with Soviet scientists, we gained
further ideas about the relationship be-
tween the theoretical problems in research-
ing electronic computers and practical
problems. We also learned the subjects
that we should emphasize to develop our
own computer industry.
5. We appreciated the spirit of the Soviet
scientists working in research and develop-
ment within a socialist state. We saw how
this spirit supports a socialist society by
initiating advanced work, by carrying out
and completing suchwork. This was a good
example for us to learn from.
By attending this computing technology
congress, the delegation gained significant
ideas for developing Chinese computing tech-
nology.14
Long-term plan for technology
The CAS delegation’s visit to Moscow co-
incided with an effort to develop a 12-year
long-term protocol for developing a national
science and technology program in China.
This plan had been initiated by the Chinese
State Department in January 1956 and was
conducted by the Science Planning Commis-
sion of the State Council. Premier Zhou Enlai
himself guided this task.15 The Science Plan-
ning Commission began its work in Beijing in
March 1956. According to CAS vice-secretary-
general Du Runsheng’s recollection, the Sci-
ence Planning Commission prepared the re-
port Long-term Protocol for Developing National
Sciences and Technology between 1956 and 1967
with help from Soviet consultant Lazarenko.16
The Science PlanningCommission assigned
a group of experts—mathematicians, comput-
er experts, and other specialists from the
Chinese Department of Electronic Industry—
to write the computing plan. The group
included some of those who had participated
in the March 1956 Moscow meeting. It also
included people who had studied in the US
and knew something about computer devel-
opment there.17
The 12-year plan encouraged education
and research.18 While developing its plan,
the computing technology planning commis-
sion offered a series of public lectures by
members of the Chinese delegation who had
attended the March 1956 meeting in Moscow.
These lectures presented worldwide develop-
ments in computing technology, explained
the work of CAS’s computer research group,
and at one lecture, scientists demonstrated
a drum memory that CAS had recently de-
veloped. Qian Xuesen, superintendent of
CAS’s Institute of Mechanics, discussed the
necessity of developing an electronic comput-
er to assist his work in designing jet and rocket
technology.19
Shortly after the 12-year plan was initiated,
D.U. Panov, director of the Soviet Institute of
Information and deputy director of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Computing,
replaced Lebedev in China as the consultant to
the Science Planning Commission. After Pa-
nov arrived in Beijing, he gave lectures about
computer development to Chinese experts
and to the Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party’s Central Commit-
tee.20 He introduced the topic of computer
research, explained the Soviet experience with
these machines, and discussed how the Soviet
Union had developed computers. He brought
documentation for the Chinese: six copies of
a report related to the BESM and one copy of
a paper on program design,21 and indicated
that the Soviet Union would help China
manufacture computers.22 Panov gave many
helpful suggestions about the Chinese com-
puting plan: identified projects that should be
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promoted, explained how Soviet electronic
computers could be purchased, detailed which
people could be sent to the Soviet Union to
study, and so on. Furthermore, he suggested to
Hua Luogeng that a delegation be sent to the
Soviet Union to visit and study for a short time
as soon as the computing plan was complete.
The delegation’s members could then teach
others about computing technology when
they returned to China.1
‘First assembling, then separating’
Members of the Chinese Planning Com-
mission had differing opinions about starting
computer research. Some insisted that a large
delegation of Chinese scientists be sent to the
Soviet Union for training and then come back
with Soviet-made computers. The Soviet In-
stitute’s Panov agreed with this idea as did
Cherkashin. But because the commission
could reach no agreement, the planning group
could take no action.
Within the Planning Commission, some
scientists said that China should establish
many institutes (generally within universities)
and that these institutes should conduct
research independently. After discussion, the
group concluded that China should first
establish a central institute but eventually
create a number of independent institutes.
This idea, first articulated by Hua Luogeng,
was called first assembling to surmount difficul-
ties and then separating to develop. The idea was
that, first, China would collect researchers
from many disciplines into a new Institute of
Computing Technology. Then, as the group
matured and trained more researchers and
workers, it would gradually be dispersed into
smaller, independent institutes.1
In June 1956, the Planning Commission
completed the Long-term Protocol for Developing
National Sciences and Technology between 1956
and 1967 report. The protocol consisted of 57
significant science and technology tasks. Task
number 41 related to the foundation of
computer technology and became the guiding
document for developing China’s computing
technology enterprise.23 The long-term pro-
tocol report defined the purpose of China’s
computer research: to improve the national
economy, national defense, and academic
research. It outlined the status and compari-
son of Soviet and Western computer research,
and it described the relevant specialties in
Soviet universities. The report also acknowl-
edged that China had no electronic digital
computers and that China was very weak in
other relevant aspects. Finally, it stated that
China lacked a comprehensive, long-term, and
integrated plan for creating computers.
Accordingly, the plan emphasized that
China should begin as soon as possible to
design and manufacture a high-speed, all-
purpose digital computer and to master the
basic technology to develop different types of
computers. The report recommended that
China study Soviet achievements in this field
while it resolved problems such as computer
program design, automatic translation, and so
on.
Steps for researchers to take
The long-term 1956–1967 plan, following
the first assembling and then separating princi-
ple, outlined the steps thatChinese researchers
should take. It proposed creating a special
office to create an Institute of Computing
Technology in CAS with the Soviet Union’s
help. This temporary office would prepare for
the institute’s official creation in 1957. Other
institutes would collaborate with CAS’s In-
stitute of Computing Technology until they
could gradually release their own personnel to
other institutes. The 1956–1967 plan also
stated that the new Institute of Computing
would havemanufacturing facilities associated
with it and that CAS would establish a com-
puting center in 1959, with the expectation
that this single center would quickly expand
into two or three centers.
With regard to acquiring international
equipment, the 1956–1967 plan called for
China to purchase electronic computers man-
ufactured by the Soviet Academy of Sciences’
Institute of Computing Technology. Further,
the plan specified that Chinese experts would
design electronic computers with help from
Soviet experts—moreover, that China would
work to produce hardware based on Soviet
hardware by 1957. The plan went on to
stipulate that China would purchase any
equipment that it couldn’t make for the
computermanufacturing facilities, from either
the Soviet Union or Western socialist coun-
tries.
As part of its work, the temporary office
would establish a one-year computer training
class to teach the basic concepts of computer
manufacture and operations. According to the
1956–1967 plan, this office would continue to
teach this course for three or four years. By
then, graduates could create their own classes
at Chinese universities. The temporary office
would create a library of the relevant books
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and periodicals relevant on computing tech-
nology.
Training the researchers
The 1956–1967 plan gave specific details
about training Chinese researchers:23
N To train computer engineers, the new
Institute should send a group of 10 to 25
radio or electrical engineers to the Soviet
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Comput-
ing Technology for one year;
N To train professional people in program-
ming and computing technology, China
should send 10 to 25 students to the Soviet
Academy of Sciences’ computing center for
a year;
N To improve the professional level of the
teachers in electronic computers, China
should send a group of teachers to the
Soviet Union to study for one or two
months in summer 1956;
N To study the manufacture of electronic
computers, China should send about 25
to 30 high school graduates to the Institute
of Motion Dynamics. It should also send
another 25 to 30 high school graduates to
Moscow University to study computational
mathematics. The Soviet Higher Education
Commission would be asked to make
a special, accelerated learning plan for these
students so that they could be qualified as
experts within four years instead of the
normal five and a half years.
N China would request that the Soviet gov-
ernment send teachers who will give
courses in computers and computing tech-
nology. Meanwhile, these Soviet teachers
could also teach the training courses given
to Chinese engineers in mathematics and
take on some work in the Institute of
Computing Technology.
N Programming and computational mathe-
matics courses would be added to the
curriculum of Chinese college and graduate
students studying mathematics and me-
chanics in the Soviet Union. In addition,
Chinese students in the Soviet Union who
were studying electrical engineering would
also take courses in designing and
manufacturing electronic computers.
Comparing the suggestions that Lebedev
had made during the March 1956 Moscow
conference attended by the Chinese14 and the
plans in the Long-term Protocol for Developing
National Sciences and Technology between 1956
and 196723 for the foundation of computing
technology, we see that the plan’s basic
contents were essentially those originating
with Lebedev, having been brought back to
China by the Chinese delegation. These ideas
had also been articulated by the Science
Planning Commission of the State Council
and by Panov after he arrived in China.24
Emergency development measures
The State Council’s Science Planning Com-
mission then presented the 1956–1967 plan to
Zhou Enlai. Zhou, however, responded that
the printed book was too detailed—he wanted
a report that analyzed only the most urgent
issues.25 In response, the State Council orga-
nized a team to prepare emergency measures
to speed up development of computers,
semiconductors, automatic control, electron-
ics, atomic energy, and missiles. The Science
Planning Commission’s secretary general,
Zhang Jinfu, asked Qian Sanqiang, Hua Luo-
geng, Qian Weichang, Wang Shouwu, and
Luo Peilin to draft the emergency measures
report. Lougeng wrote the section on compu-
ters, and Peilin wrote about electronics. Secre-
tary General Jinfu outlined five emergency
measures, plus a sixth on missile development
for vice prime minister Nie Rongzhen to
implement.26 Because China, at that time,
kept secret its activities in atomic energy and
missile development, the committee separated
these two issues from the rest. The other four
emergency measures were assembled into a re-
port titled The Emergency Measures and Projects
about the Development of Computing Technology,
Semiconductor Technology, Radio Electronics,
Automatics and Long-Distance Controlling Tech-
nology (the report is known in shortened form
as Four Emergency Measures).25 Computing
technology was included in the final draft
because of Qian Xuesen’s influence. The
superintendent of CAS’s Institute of Mechan-
ics cited many examples to illustrate the
importance of high-speed electronic compu-
ters. These examples sufficiently persuaded the
committee to identify computing technology
as one of the emergency measures.27
On 20 May 1956, the Four Emergency
Measures report was officially presented to the
State Department, championed by Zhou Enlai,
and was approved.28 The Science Planning
Commission of the State Council officially
printed the report later, on 5 July.24 The
section on computing technology looked
much like the earlier (1956–1967) government
report on establishing computing.29 The main
difference between the two reports was the
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tone. In contrast to the original report, Four
Emergency Measures stated that China should
take steps as quickly as possible to develop its
computing technology and to cooperate with
the Soviet Union.29
Meanwhile, following Zhou Enlai’s instruc-
tions, the CAS commissioned Hua Luogeng to
take charge of preparing the office of the
Institute of Computing Technology. On 19
June 1956, Hua chaired the preliminary
meeting of the Preparation Commission for
the Institute of Computing Technology—
Preparation Commission, for short.30 It was
called the Preparation Commission because
officially, the CAS Institute of Computing
Technology was not founded until May
1959. Attending the meeting were the vice
secretary-general of CAS, Du Runsheng, and
the vice director of the Division of Mathemat-
ics, Physics, and Chemistry, Yun Ziqiang. The
commission—consisting of computing experts
from CAS, various government agencies, and
colleges and universities—was formally ac-
cepted by the government on 25 August 1956.
The PreparationCommission oversaw three
research departments, one administration of-
fice, and one experimental factory. The first
research department, which dealt with com-
puter software and operations, was directed by
Min Naida. The second research department,
the hardware department, was directed by
Wang Zheng. The third research department
dealt with computational mathematics and
was directed by Xu Xianyu.
The administration office had five person-
nel divisions: secretary, general affairs, equip-
ment, accounting, and a translation group.
There was also a temporary training class
controlled by the Preparation Commission.
Two years later, in November 1958, the
commission would establish an information
division. These organizations employed Soviet
experts to give lectures and guidance. They
translated and published several dozen books
and pamphlets on special computing subjects
and compiled a Chinese-Russian dictionary of
computing technology.31 In December 1958,
the preparation office would create the first
Chinese computer journal, The Trend of Elec-
tronic Computers.
Second CAS study delegation
After creating the Preparation Commission,
CAS organized a second study delegation to
visit the Soviet Union. CAS decided to send
a group of researchers with practical experi-
ence, a strong theoretical background, and
who were roughly 35 years old.10,32 In August
1956, the Science PlanningCommission of the
State Council invited Zhou Shouxian of
Qinghua University, Xu Xianyu of Beijing
University, and Jiang Shifei of the Beijing
Institute of Aeronautics to join the group. This
invitation was followed, three weeks later, by
a letter from the third department of the
Headquarters of General Staff of the military,
which askedCAS to choose a cadre of 10 others
to study electronic computer technology at
the Soviet Academy of Sciences.33 The CAS
delegation consisted of 15 people. Most were
scientists; several were translaters and one was
a secretary.
The investigation group met during late
August and early September to prepare for
their trip. Three basic documents guided their
preparations: ‘‘The Working Planning of the
Computing Technology Investigation Group
of CAS in the Soviet Union,’’ ‘‘The Designing
Assignments of the Institute of Computing
Technology of CAS,’’ and ‘‘The Tentative
Working Contents of the Computing Tech-
nology Investigation Group of CAS in the
Soviet Union.’’ The first of these documents
dealt with the scope of the trip; this paper
instructed CAS to send 10 researchers to the
Soviet Union so they could learn about the
state of Soviet work on computing.24
‘‘The Working Planning of the Comput-
ing Technology Investigation Group of CAS
in the Soviet Union’’ paper dealt with many
problems in computer research, including
the direct transfer of technology from the
Soviet Union to China, the training of senior
Chinese researchers, the organization and
management of computer research, the
education of new computer scientists, and
the collection of books and other instruc-
tional material on computers. Moreover, the
delegation was instructed to visit Soviet labs,
to discuss matters of technical cooperation,
to see the work relevant to mechanical
manufacturing and mathematics, to learn
how to conduct a computer training course
and how to set up a computing specialty in
universities, and to learn how to administer
computing research.
Delegation’s responsibilities
The delegation, led by Min Naida, left
China in small groups after 11 September
1956.24 They traveled to the Soviet Academy
of Sciences’ Institute of Computing Technol-
ogy, where they were hosted by Sergei Lebe-
dev.34 The delegation led this group to in-
vestigate the research, production, and
January–March 2007 23
education of computing technology in Mos-
cow and Leningrad. Each member of the
delegation was responsible to investigate a dif-
ferent aspect of computer technology or
a different computer institution.
All told, the delegation visited 21 Soviet
organizations. Of those, 10 belonged to the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, 8 belonged to the
Ministry of Radio Industry, of which 1 was
attached to the Ministry of Instrument and
Automation industry, and 3 were educational
organizations.24 The delegation spent most of
their time at the Institute of Precision Ma-
chinery and Computing Technology, the
Computing Center of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, and the Moscow CAM Computer
Factory. They became very familiar with the
M-20 computer but they also saw the BESM,
Strela, M-2, M-3, Ural, and the IPT analog
computers as well as punch card computers.
They visited the CAM Factory many times to
learn how to manufacture the M-20.
During the visit, experts from the Institute
of Precision Machinery and Computing Tech-
nology, the Computing Center of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, and Moscow University
gave 22 academic lectures to the Chinese
delegation. The lectures involved mathemat-
ics, computers, arithmetic units, memories,
elements, and the control and application of
semiconductors. Following these lectures, the
delegation focused on the study of large-sized
all-purpose computers: the BESM and the M-
20. They divided into small groups and visited
different Soviet research institutes for study
purposes and to participate in experimental
work.
Informal discussions with Soviets
While visiting Moscow, Min, accompanied
by other CAS members, had many informal
discussions with Lebedev and Panov; also with
S. Mukhin, a computing technology scientist
in the Institute of Precision Machinery and
Computing Technology, and the principals of
each research department of that institute. The
delegation asked questions about research
management, key research tasks, building
a research department, and organizing and
administering an institute. They also asked
about building the first Institute of Computing
Technology in China; computer development;
equipment needed in research departments;
factory requirements; and issues concerning to
personnel training. The delegation negotiated
matters relating to the invitation of the Soviet
experts to China, the number of Chinese
scientists who could receive advanced train-
ing, and the purchase of Soviet-made ma-
chines. Additionally, the delegation inquired
about conducting computing technology
training courses and establishing a computing
course of study in universities.
Lebedev invited the principals of each Soviet
research department to introduce their work
and give specific suggestions on constructing
a Chinese research institute. The Soviet scien-
tists gave the visiting delegation 90 pages of
suggestions and technical reports. This sugges-
tion notebook related the projects, concepts,
and procedures of the research departments’
organizational systems; the research direction
and tasks; numbers and proportion of every
kind of personnel; the size of laboratories; types
and numbers of equipment; and so on.
Delegation reports to CAS
The Chinese delegation, which left the
Soviet Union in late fall 1956, reported on 18
December to the 37th meeting of the CAS
standing committee.35 The Working Summary
of this Investigation Group report, coupled with
members’ personal recollections, conveyed to
CAS what the committee had learned.22,24,34
In essence, the visit was highly positive: the
delegation learned much about the Soviet
scientists’ computing skills, which they ad-
mired, and had come away with enough
knowledge so that they themselves could
quickly organize research labs, start education-
al programs, and begin constructing comput-
ing equipment. The report also indicated
a future of promising technical cooperation
between China and the Soviet Union.
The returning Chinese delegationmade the
following suggestions:24
N Create an Institute of Computing Technol-
ogy in the CAS by fall 1957,
N Begin cooperating with Soviet computer
researchers,
N Create Chinese versions of the BESM and
M-20 computers,
N Use replicates of the Soviet computers to
train Chinese workers to build and operate
computers,
N Send a delegation to buy Soviet computers
and components (the delegates noted that
this should be done secretly),
N Begin plans tomake computer components
in China,
N Ask Soviets to transfer information about
computers, and
N Ask Soviets to send five experts to China for
six months.
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Beyond recommendations for creating
a Chinese computing infrastructure, the dele-
gation identified problems that would soon
need to be addressed. Problems needing
resolution included these: the fundamental
question of building a few large computers or
many small computers; the need to cooperate
with the Ministry of Mechanical Industry, the
General Staff of the Military, and the Ministry
of Higher Education; a concern for placing
researcherswith theMinistry of Education; the
need to obtain equipment for experimental
factories; and the need to build its infrastruc-
ture quickly.
China–Soviet aid conventions
In fall 1957, the Chinese government sent
a third delegation, headed by Guo Moruo, to
the SovietUnion tonegotiate a comprehensive
science and technology agreement between
the two governments, which would cover
China’s second five-year plan.36 Delegation
members in the computing field includedMin
Naida, Qian Wenji, and Luo Peilin. The group
talked with Soviet representatives Lebedev, A.
Dorodnitsin, and a Mr. Boryuk. Zhang Xiao-
xiang, who at that time was studying in the
Soviet Union, was also involved in the meet-
ings.
After much discussion between the Soviet
Union and China, the two countries signed,
on 11 December 1957, a five-year agreement
titled ‘‘The Convention on the Scientific and
Technical Cooperation between the Academy
of Sciences of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics and Chinese Academy of Sciences
(1958–1962).’’ At this meeting, Guo Moruo
represented CAS. In accordance with this
convention, the two countries’ academies of
sciences signed a second scientific protocol the
following year. This protocol outlined the
cooperation between the Soviet Academy of
Sciences’ Institute of Computing, the Soviet
Academy of Sciences’ Computing Center, and
the CAS’s Institute of Computing Technolo-
gy.37 With this protocol, the Soviet Union
agreed to accept four to six researchers from
the CAS’s Institute of Computing Technology
and involve them in computer research and
manufacture. The Soviets also agreed to send
four experts to China to initiate Chinese
computer research and to accept four post-
graduate students for advanced study. Finally,
the Soviet Union agreed to send experts to
China for a short-term visit whenever there
was a specific technical problem to solve.38
Besides the conventions signed between
the two countries’ academies of sciences, the
Soviet Union and China also endorsed ‘‘The
Convention on the Cooperative Scientific and
Technical Research.’’ A key item in this
document was the establishment of scientific
research and the industrial basis of computing
technology. The electrical engineering group
took charge of the specific negotiation of
computing technology and reached an agree-
ment to start computer research in China.39
The agreement considered opening a Chi-
nese computing laboratory in the Soviet
Union with roughly 30 researchers but con-
cluded that such a decision should be made in
the future. It stated that the first goal of the
CAS Institute of Computing Technology was
to build a copy of the BESM and theM-3 Soviet
computers. It also stated the conditions under
which the Soviet Union would transfer the
technology necessary to build these machines.
In addition, the agreement also included
a provision for building an analog computer
in China after 1958.
During discussions with their Soviet coun-
terparts, the Chinese found that they would
need to adjust their original plans. They had
intended to first build an M-20 computer but,
after learning that the Soviets were having
trouble with their version of that computer,
the Chinese decided instead to build a copy of
the older BESM. The Soviets delivered the
BESM technical specifications in the first
quarter of 1958.40
As the Chinese prepared to build the BESM,
the Soviets had two suggestions:41 First, they
suggested that China proceed with creating
a computer research department in the Soviet
Union for the purpose of designing, with
guidance from Soviet experts, a midsized
digital computer. The department would be
staffed by 15 to 20 specialists. The Soviets also
suggested that China begin designing its own
computer immediately. The Soviets would
send some experts to help with this project
and promised to supply computer compo-
nents. In the process, they gave no specific
suggestions about the nature of the computers
that the Chinese would create, although they
indicated that this project would take consid-
erably longer than establishing the computer
laboratory in Russia.
The Chinese researchers were more at-
tracted to the idea of building their own
computer, however, than to working in the
Soviet Union. They felt that building their
own computer would bemore beneficial to the
growth of China’s computing industry and to
the acquisition of a midsized digital computer
in the shortest time possible. The Chinese
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acknowledged that this project might require
more foreign exchange than establishing
a laboratory in Russia, but that it should be
adopted anyway.41
In mid-December 1957, Min Naida re-
turned to China to seek guidance about the
choice between the two competing projects.
Because Chinese officials wanted to expand
every aspect of the electronic computer in-
dustry and to train a large number of technical
specialists at home, they decided that they
couldn’t send their experts to live in Russia.
Therefore, they decided to forgo establishing
a Chinese laboratory in the Soviet Union and
instead learn how to manufacture the BESM
computer in China.
At December’s end, Min returned to the
Soviet Union to continue negotiations. His
work concluded with an agreement to pur-
chase a BESM-II computer from the Soviet
Union and duplicate that computer in Chi-
na.42 The BESM-II computer was an improved
version of the original BESM. Its technical
specifications and architecture were the same
as for the original BESM except for improve-
ments in the assembling structure, some
internal components, and replacing the CRT
memory with magnetic core and in some
peripheral equipment. At the time, the BESM
had a 10-millisecond clock. The agreement
also included how the two countries should
cooperate on the development of the digital
computer and of analog computers.
This agreement embodied every idea that
had been put forward in the plan to establish
computing technology and in ‘‘The Emergen-
cy Measures of Computing Technology.’’
Before the relationship between the Soviet
Union andChina broke down in 1960, the two
countries successfully implemented each item
in the agreement.
Training the researchers
In February 1957, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences selected 20 professionals for advanced
studies in the Soviet Union. The group, headed
by Zhang Xiaoxiang, consisted of individuals
largely between 25 and 30 years in age. In all,
they came from five cooperative units.43 Most
of their classes concerned the design and
operation of the Soviet M-20 computer. Their
teachers were the principal officers in research
departments or key engineers. In early 1958,
some of the Chinese students were transferred
to study the BESM-II computer, which was the
basis for the 104 computer and the BESM-II
computer. After 18 months of study, most
students had mastered the basic Soviet tech-
nology and went on to work on the 104
computer—essentially a BESM copy—and de-
veloped an application for the computer.18
The team returned to China in 1958, except
for one student who remained in the Soviet
Union until 1959.44
Originally, the Chinese State Council’s
Science Planning Commission had planned
to send 60 to 100 high school graduates to
study computers in the Soviet Union, but the
Soviets had agreed to accept only 30 stu-
dents.45 Thus, in the latter half of 1956, China
had chosen 30 high school graduates with one
year of study in the Soviet Union. Half of these
students had been sent out to the Institute of
Motion Dynamics; the other half to the
Institute of Leningrad Engineering. Most of
these students had returned to China after
graduating in 1962.1
Between 1956 and 1959, the Preparation
Commission selected 10 individuals to study
in the Soviet Union for an academic degree:44
five studied at the Soviet Academy of Sciences’
Institute of Computing; the other five were at
the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ Computing
Center. Most of these postgraduates returned
to China between 1960 and 1962—for various
reasons, only four received a degree equivalent
to the doctor of philosophy.
In early 1956, CAS had found that it
needed more trained people than it could
find. That March, in an effort to quickly bring
workers up to speed with the requisite skills,
the Institute of Modern Physics’ computer
research group had conducted a computer
study group at the Institute of Mathematics.
This group had more than 20 participants,
including people from Beijing University and
Tsinghua University. Xia Peisu lectured to the
group, explaining the basic principles and
operationalmethods of electronic computers.1
The group met once a week for more than
three months.
Later in 1956, theCAS investigation learned
the methods to conduct a computing tech-
nology training course from the Soviet Acad-
emy of Sciences and other relevant units.46
According to the plan, from the latter half of
1956 to 1962, the Preparation Commission
held four training classes, lasting one or two
years each, and cultivated 684 computer
technology professionals who reached the
graduate level.44
In the late 1950s, the Preparation Commis-
sion had held three training classes, which
received Soviet help directly or indirectly.
Some of the classes’ teachers had been mem-
bers of the delegation that had earlier visited
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the Soviet Union, and some were those
postgraduates who had returned after studying
in the Soviet Union. The lecture topics were
based on Soviet computing technology. One
of the teachers was an expert from the Soviet
Academy of Sciences’ Computing Center, U.D.
Shmiglebsky. The course text was a Chinese
translation of a 1,000-page manual that D.U.
Panov had brought to China.47
Between fall 1960 and summer 1962, the
CAS Institute of Computing Technology and
the Chinese University of Science and Tech-
nology ran the fourth training class, which
had about 150 students. In all, CAS trained
more than 800 people in computing technol-
ogy between 1956 and 1962.44 This training
prepared urgently needed people for work in
computer research and manufacturing. Ulti-
mately, those attending the courses mastered
the required technology and knowledge, and
were instrumental in developing the 104, 109,
and 119 computers.44
Duplicating the Soviet computer
At the end of 1957, CAS received the
technical drawings and specifications from
the Soviet Union for the M-3 computer. At
that time, CAS formed a committee to study
the drawings and prepare to duplicate its
design. This committee was headed by Mo
Gensheng, who had translated a book on the
M-3 computer, and Zhang Zichang.48 At the
same time, the Preparation Commission
signed a contract with the 738th Factory of
Beijing to manufacture M-3 and BESM-II
computers. In December 1957, when CAS
received the remaining engineering drawings
for the M-3, the Preparation Commission
formed an M-3 engineering group. Beginning
in March 1958, the 738th Factory of Beijing
started the trial manufacture of M-3 compu-
ters. By September, it had produced the first
working small digital computer.48 This com-
puter was named by Youle, which means we
have a computer for the first time. The name was
later changed to August 1st, which had
significance because it was the day theChinese
People’s Liberation Armywas formed. In 1959,
when it was manufactured in small batches,
the computer’s name was changed again to
the 103 computer (see Figure 1).
The 103 electronic computer was almost
entirely made on the basis of Soviet M-3
computer specifications. The M-3, a first-gen-
eration computer, contained 800 vacuum
tubes, 2,000 copper oxide diodes, 10,000
capacitor elements, 400 plugs in three cabi-
nets, and a 1,024-word-capacity magnetic
drum. The M-3 was a binary fixed-point, 32-
bit word computer. The Chinese engineers
slightly modified the Soviet design:48 Al-
though the original computer’s Enhanced
Messaging Service used a vertical memory
drum, theChinese engineers added amagnetic
core memory. The original input device was
a teletype keyboard, but the Chinese added
a photoelectric tape reader. The original out-
put device was a teleprinter that the Chinese
replaced with a high-speed printer. These
changes increased the calculation speed from
30 to 1,800 operations per second. The input
speed was increased from 52 to 1,250 digits per
minute. The output speed improved from 24
to 650 digits per minute.49
Early achievements
By 1958, China directed some of the 20
students in the Soviet Union to change their
studies and learn about the BESM-II computer.
To do so, these students remained in the Soviet
Union for an extra six months, then returned
to China by May 1958 and began work to
create a BESM-II. With the Soviets’ help, they
were able to create an operating BESM by
September 1959. This machine was China’s
first large-sized, all-purpose digital electronic
computer. Named the 104, it was only slightly
different from the BESM (see Figure 1).50
The 104 computer featured
N a binary system,
N 39-word length,
Figure 1. The 103 computer. (Courtesy of CAS.)
January–March 2007 27
N a three-address instruction,
N a 2,048-word magnetic core memory,
N two 6,000-word magnetic drum memories,
N 10-microsecond access time,
N 10,000-operations-per-second perfor-
mance,
N floating-point arithmetic operation,
N 120,000-word magnetic tape storage,
N 10,000-operations-per-second average cal-
culating speed,
N a photoelectric paper tape reader for
input with a speed of 15 numbers per
second, and
N a printer capable of 15 lines per second.
The 104 was comparable to an IBM 704
computer in 1956.51 The 104 was inferior to
the newer machines being produced in the US
and the Soviet Union, but it was better than
those coming out of England, Japan, andWest
Germany.52
By duplicating the M-3 and the BESM-II,
Chinese engineers mastered computer design
and manufacturing techniques. They trained
a complete technical contingent in computer
research, design,manufacture, and operations.
These two computers—the 103 and 104—
completed the initial state of China’s comput-
er development and were the major accom-
plishments of the initial 12-year plan.
Between December 1961 and January
1962, the 103 and 104 computers were
certified as formal industrial products of the
People’s Republic of China.53 Both machines
were given to military departments and
made an important contribution in a variety
of ways. For example, the 103 computer was
used for short-term weather forecasting, for
calculating the platform’s mechanical struc-
ture in the Great Hall of the People, and for
analyzing aerial surveys. The 104 computer
was used in national defense, for advanced
scientific research, meteorology, survey, dam
hydrology, architecture, design of power
equipment, and so on. Most visibly, the 104
computer aided engineers in the theoretical
design and detonation of the first Chinese
atomic bomb.54
During the process of duplicating the M-3
and BESM computers, Soviet experts played an
important role. Between the end of 1957 and
the end of 1959, seven Soviet experts came to
China and helped CAS.55 In particular, they
helped resolve crucial problems such as mag-
netic core memory manufacture, core storage
installation and testing, operation control
adjustment, peripheral equipment design
and testing, as well as testing the entire system.
Several Soviet experts extended their stay in
China because of the need to solve difficult
problems.56 The Soviets’ role began to decline
only after the cohort of students returned from
the Soviet Union, a time that corresponded to
China’s work on the 104 computer.57 After
these researchers returned, the Soviets’ role
diminished noticeably.
Problems on the horizon
During the period when China was dupli-
cating Soviet electronic computers, China
embraced Mao Zedong’s idea of the Great
Leap Forward. This idea, promoted in 1958,
was intended to spur China’s economic
growth, caused the Chinese leadership to set
some impractical goals that slowed research on
computers.58 In building the 103 computer,
for example, Chinese industry did not imple-
ment sufficient inspection procedures to en-
sure a quality project. Pressured to build an
unrealistic number of computers, workers
were reluctant to stop production lines and
hence accepted inferior or flawed compo-
nents. The visiting Soviet experts noticed this
problem and suggested that the Chinese
should change their production methods.
However, because China was committed to
break from convention andmove its economy
forward, Chinese manufacturers did not fol-
low the Soviet advice but instead tried to fix
the problem with superficial solutions. As
a result, the workers produced few operational
computers. When China started building the
104 computer, officials recognized the prob-
lems of poor quality and adjusted their
methods, but these steps failed to fix the
problems.58 According to Zhang Xiaoxiang’s
recollection, China had no significant failures
Figure 2. The 104 computer. (Courtesy of CAS.)
Founding: CAS Institute of Computing Technology
28 IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
with the 104 computer’s components, and it
reliably operated for many years.59
The Chinese modified the 103’s design
shortly after the computer went into pro-
duction. In deciding to modify the com-
puter, the Chinese experts fell into two
camps. One group argued that the 103
design should be improved before the ma-
chine was ready for full production and
operation; the other urged that the machine
be produced and operated as soon as the
design was ready. The Soviet expert G.P.
Lopato helped resolve this issue. He argued
that the 103 design needed to be improved
and helped the Chinese experts who favored
that decision to convince the others of the
plan’s benefits. Lopato argued that the result-
ing machine would be more reliable and
stable.22
Founding of computing institute
After years of operating through the Prep-
aration Committee, CAS officially founded its
Institute of Computing Technology on17May
1959. Over the following years, CAS set up in
succession nearly 20 institutes of computing
technology, computing centers, and computer
research departments in Shanghai, Shenyang,
Wuhan, Xian, Chengdu, Hefei, Nanjing, Tian-
jin, and Taiyuan.53 Following the principle of
first assembling and then separating, as out-
lined in the 1956–1967 plan, the individuals
who had transferred to work at the Institute of
Computing Technology from the third de-
partment of the Headquarters of the General
Staff, the Ministry of the Second Mechanical
Industry, the Fifth Institute of National De-
fense, and from colleges and universities, all
returned to their original departments. By the
early 1960s, these research organizations
started their own work in duplicating Soviet
computers.
Beginning with the duplicates of the Soviet
M-3 and BESM-II computers, China later
developed vacuum tube and transistor com-
puters on its own. Within six or seven years
after duplicating the BESM-II, China success-
fully developed
N the 107 computer—with vacuum tubes
(April 1960),
N the 119 computer—with vacuum tubes;
a large-sized, all-purpose computer (April
1964),
N the 109 computer Model II—with transis-
tors; a large-sized, all-purpose digital com-
puter (1965), and
N the 109 computer Model III—with transis-
tors; a large-sized all-purpose digital com-
puter (1967).
Other Chinese institutions had also made
strides in the 1960s. The Huabei Institute of
Computing Technology, the Huadong Insti-
tute of Computing Technology, Tsinghua
University, and the Haerbin Institute of Elec-
tronic Engineering had achieved significant
progress in developing transistor computers
as well. These computers played a signifi-
cant part in China’s development of the
atomic and hydrogen bombs and China’s
management of its economy. These computers
symbolized China’s mastering of Soviet tech-
nology.
Conclusions
The earliest interest in computing in China
dates to 1951, when Hua Luogeng, a CAS
mathematician, suggested developing a group
devoted to computational mathematics and
computing technology. The Institute of Math-
ematics organized a few people to start work in
this field; however, no one knew much about
computing’s mathematical or technical as-
pects. The group did not accomplish much
until the academy drafted the Long-Term Pro-
tocol for Developing National Sciences and Tech-
nology between 1956 and 1967 and the sub-
sequent Four Emergency Measures. Once those
two documents were complete, the Chinese
successfully duplicated the Soviet computing
effort in roughly two years’ time. Clearly, the
development of computing technology need-
ed the support of the state before it could
proceed.
Besides state support, computer science
needed a well-conceived plan to advance.
The Chinese plan followed the suggestions of
Soviet expert Lebedev and drew on the idea of
first assembling to surmount difficulties and
then separating to develop computers that
Hua Luogeng had recommended. The point
onwhich it differed from Lebedev’s suggestion
was in the decision to forego the creation of
a Chinese computing laboratory in Russia. The
success of the Chinese effort shows that such
a laboratory was not necessary. The advantage
of such a laboratory was that it might have
lessened the ill-effects of the Great Leap For-
ward, but as we have seen, that period of
political turmoil did not significantly affect
computer development. In the process of
making and carrying out its plan for creating
computers, the Chinese government relied on
both Chinese and Soviet experts. Without the
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Soviet experts and information, it would be
unimaginable for the Chinese to have mas-
tered computing technology within several
years.
In all, the Soviets helped their Chinese
counterparts in eight key areas. First, a Soviet
conference in 1956 informed the Chinese
about the accomplishments of Soviet comput-
er experts and started the planning for Chinese
computer research. Second, Soviet experts,
most notably Lebedev, helped the Chinese
prepare a 12-year plan for computing.
Third, in September 1956, the Soviet Acad-
emy of Sciences hosted a delegation fromCAS.
This delegation visited the organizations of
computer research, design, trial-manufacture,
production, and higher education in the
Soviet Union, and learned theories and tech-
niques for every aspect of computer develop-
ment. Fourth, shortly after this visit, the
Soviets agreed to provide the Chinese with
computers, computer plans, and computer
components.
Fifth, the Soviets trained Chinese students
at the Institute of the Computing Technology,
the Computing Center of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences, Institute of Molotov Dynamics,
and Institute of Leningrad Engineering. In
turn, these people trained others in China.
Sixth, the Soviet Academy of Sciences helped
Chinese engineers duplicate the M-3 and the
BESM-II. In this effort, Chinese scientists
actually improved the Soviet designs.
Seventh, Soviet technology was spread
through the Institute of Computing Technol-
ogy of CAS. This institute played the role of an
incubator and a disseminator. Finally, Soviet
technology provided examples to Chinese
researchers as they created the 107, 119, 109
Model II, and 109Model III between 1960 and
1965.60 In this last effort, China moved into
the transistor stage and demonstrated its
ability to design and manufacture computers.
All in all, the Soviet Union aided China to
create its first computers by successfully trans-
ferring its technology. This transfer occurred
under specific historical conditions and in
a manner very different from the usual way of
technology transfer between countries. For
example, it was carried out during a time of
cooperation between the two governments.
The technology transfer occurred when the
two governments were interested in forging
a larger, more productive relationship as
a bulwark against the West. Therefore, when
the general conventions on computer tech-
nology were signed, the two countries did
not worry about agreements on technical
patents and the distribution of economic
benefits among the various institutions. The
agreements were surprisingly flexible, for
activities involving the Soviets, and had no
limitation of scope. The friendship between
the Soviet Union and China fostered a com-
fortable atmosphere for the Soviet Union to
help with founding the Institute of Comput-
ing Technology and transferring computing
technology.
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